Analysis of objective oriented perspectives for the calculation of Solvency Capital Requirement for pension funds considering Solvency II and IORP II

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Pension funds in Germany

contract
- increases in contributions (risks explicitly assumed, recovery plans)
- reduction of benefits in case of sponsor default

pension protection schemes
- PSV

national social, labour and supervision law
- subsidiary liability of employer
Risk situation of the parties involved

- Employer does not pay
  - Conversion to insurance-type guarantee
    - Reduction of benefits
      - Yes: Transfer assets/commitments
        - Liability of PSV
      - No: Benefits secured by the PSV?
        - Yes: Additional costs for employer
          - Employer pays
          - Additional costs for PSV (+ other employers)
        - No: PSV pays
  - Additional costs for employer

- Employer pays
  - Contractual entitlements to additional contributions
    - Employer pays
      - Relevant risks
  - Additional contributions
    - Additional costs for employer
      - Relevant risks
Problem

- How should reasonable supervision rules for pension funds be designed?
- How to calculate Solvency Capital Requirement for a pension fund?
- How to measure the risks of a pension fund?
- Which security mechanisms should be considered in the calculations at all? How can these security mechanisms be taken into account?
Literature review

Literature on risk measurement, security mechanisms and supervision of IORPs

- [Queisser 1998]
- [Brunner, Hinz, Rocha 2008]
- [van Gaalen 2003], [Mihr 2004], [Gisler 2010]
- [Haberman, Butt, Megaloudi 2000]
- [Broeders, Chen 2010]

Discussion on IORP II

- [CEA 2009]
- [GCAE 2010], [Hügelschäffer 2011], [Reuss 2008], [Velten 2008], [Wiesner 2009]
- [EIOPA 2012]
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Who should be protected?

Protection ...

▶ ... of contractual partner?
▶ ... of beneficiary within the system?
▶ ... of stability of the system?
▶ ... from regulatory arbitrage?
Perspective 1: objectives

- protection of beneficiary within the system
Perspective 1: consequences

- consider **contractual arrangements** like risks explicitly assumed and recovery plans
- consider **national law** like subsidiary liability
- consider **pension protection schemes** like PSV
- consider **maximum value** of sponsor support and pension protection scheme
Perspective 1: assessment

- in line with technical specifications of first QIS
- not consistent with Solvency II
- no protection of employer
- risk for pension fund from financial situation of employer/PSV
- systemic risk
Perspective 2: objectives

- protection of stability of the system
- protection of contractual partner
- protection from regulatory arbitrage
Perspective 2: consequences

- consider **contractual arrangements** like risks explicitly assumed and recovery plans
Perspective 2: assessment

- consistent with Solvency II
- adequate protection of employer
- no risk for pension fund from financial situation of employer/PSV
- adequate protection of beneficiary and stability of the system (within pension fund’s area of responsibility)
- control of employer’s risks?
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Stress scenarios

\[ \Delta NAV = NAV_{normal} - NAV_{stress} \]
The model - basic idea (without security mechanisms)

aggregation to market risk

\[ SCR_{mkt} = \sqrt{\sum_{r,c} Corr_{mkt,r,c} \cdot mkt_r \cdot mkt_c} \]

aggregation to pension liability risk

\[ SCR_{pension} = \sqrt{\sum_{r,c} Corr_{pension,r,c} \cdot pension_r \cdot pension_c} \]

aggregation to SCR

\[ SCR = \sqrt{\sum_{i,j} Corr_{i,j} \cdot SCR_i \cdot SCR_j} \]
The model with adjustment for security mechanisms

\[ \text{adjustment for security mechanisms} \]
\[ Adj = - \min (BSCR - nBSCR; \text{maximum support}) \]

\[ \text{calculation of SCR} \]
\[ SCR = BSCR + Adj \]
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Example for Analysis

beneficiary
- retired male beneficiary of age 70
- annuity payment of 1000 EUR / survivorship annuity of 600 EUR per month
- no contractually specified pension dynamics

possible contractual risk sharing with employer
- market risks
- biometric risks
- recovery plan

pension fund
- assets: varying coverage ratio of pension account, additional own funds 5 %
- investment of assets: 35 % in shares, 65 % in fixed interest bearing securities
- calculatory interest rate: 4.0 % or 1.75 %
- calculatory mortality tables: Heubeck 2005 G or DAV 2004 R
Insurance type

without recovery plan:

coverage ratio (market value)

with recovery plan:

coverage ratio (market value)
Employer bearing market risk

without recovery plan:

with recovery plan:
Employer bearing biometric risk

**without recovery plan:**

![Graph showing coverage ratio (market value) without recovery plan.](image)

**with recovery plan:**

![Graph showing coverage ratio (market value) with recovery plan.](image)
Employer bearing both market and biometric risk

without recovery plan:

coverage ratio (market value)

coverage ratio (calculatory)

SCR / market value liabilities

coverage ratio (market value)

with recovery plan:

coverage ratio (market value)

coverage ratio (calculatory)

SCR / market value liabilities

coverage ratio (market value)
Critical value for maximum support

without recovery plan:

with recovery plan:
Conclusions

- The answer to the question, which security mechanisms should be taken into account for the calculation of the SCR, strongly depends on the supervisory objectives assumed.

- A general statement about which perspective delivers a higher SCR and therefore is the more stringent one, is not possible. The result strongly depends on the constellation of risk sharing, the coverage ratio and the limitation of additional support from security mechanisms.

- With Perspective 1, a recovery plan can increase the SCR.

- The critical value increases with the number of risks assumed by the employer.
Thank you for your attention!
Literature I


Literature II

Gisler T.: *Solvency Tests for Pension Funds: An International Analysis with a Standard Model*, Books on Demand, Norderstedt, 2010

Haberman S., Butt Z., Megaloudi C.: *Contribution and solvency risk in a defined benefit pension scheme*, Insurance: Mathematics and Economics 17, S. 237–259


Mihr E.: *Vorschlag zur Bestimmung der Solvabilität bei Pensionskassen*, Diplomarbeit (Swiss Pension Actuary Course)


Reuss A.: *Die Auswirkung risikobasierter Eigenmittelanforderungen auf Pension Funds*, in: BetrAV 63 (2008), S. 655–659
Literature III


Wiesner B.: *Der Weg nach Europa*, in: BetrAV 64 (2009), S. 179–180